Unfortunately China’s investments and its policy of “non-interference in internal affairs” often work in favour of some of the most infamous African dictators. Angola, Sudan, and Congo-Brazzaville, who all have bleak human rights records, have accounted for 82 per cent of China’s crude-oil supply in Africa.
Chinese investments with “no strings-attached” allow these regimes to ignore governance norms and human rights issues. One example is when the Angolan government sought funds to rebuild the country after civil war; it looked to the International Monetary Fund, who was determined to force the regime to be more transparent.
However, Angola ceased negotiations when China offered a better alternative: China’s export-credit agency counter-offered with a 2 billion dollar loan and asked for in return that 70 per cent of future substantial construction contracts be awarded to Chinese businessmen in addition to also guaranteeing more oil for the China.
Consequently, although enthusiasts of the relationship may point to the fact that China has brought Angola more revenue, (Angola was China’s top trading partner in 2010—with a trade value of USD24.8bn) this one example shows how this relationship is not necessarily benefitting the population of African countries.
China has also been involved in Sudan’s domestic affairs. Even while Sudan is China’s third biggest trading partner in Africa as of 2010, China’s involvement in Sudan has been controversial, especially when it comes to the African country’s civil war and its weapons exporting policy. China, despite being a powerful weapons exporter, has not signed any kind of agreement that bases arms export decisions on principles such as respect for human rights.
According to Amnesty International, “China has transferred military, security, and police equipment to armed forces and law enforcement agencies in countries where these arms are used for persistent and systematic violations of human rights.” This is because of their primary concern of protecting its economic interests in the region, which is its state-owned Chinese company’s 40 per cent share of Sudan’s largest oil venture, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company.
Some may argue that China’s demand for oil has been beneficial for Africa, because of growth rate creation. Others may argue that although China’s demand for oil has not been beneficial for the region, China is not solely at fault for African dependency—a number of Western powers began this exploitation in the centuries of colonialism.
Yet regardless of whether this is true, it does not mitigate the situation. There are the obvious short-term benefits for Africa (the rising growth rate) that enthusiasts cite, but the long-term trajectory raises concerns. To prevent the resource curse and to make growth sustainable, governments have to undertake appropriate measures such as investing in human capital and infrastructure. China’s surging interest in Africa’s oil threatens to only intensify Africa’s dependency, and China’s policy of ‘non-interference’ and “let’s just do business” continues to undermine democracy and government accountability in the continent.